This special issue emerges from our recognition of complementarities, shared interests, and productive tensions between the fields of surveillance studies and performance studies. While surveillance studies has certainly attended, in some fashion, to the performances of watchers and the watched, we saw potential in shifting perspective on these activities and relations in order to destabilize comfortable assumptions about power, control, and subjectivity. In the process, we hope to generate new understandings about the complex interplay of surveillance and performance, with appreciation for how cultural scripts are formed and re-formed through embodied experiences and negotiated practices.

Concerns with issues of performance are implicit in almost all studies of surveillance. For instance, both classic and ongoing studies of closed-circuit television operators demonstrate an awareness of the deeply social nature of these jobs, along with analysis of the performances of operators in profiling targets of surveillance, negotiating with other security personnel, and alleviating boredom (e.g., McCahill 2002; Norris and Armstrong 1999; Smith 2015). Others have concentrated on how individuals perform, and thus communicate, particular identities when they are faced with overt surveillance encounters. For instance, Simone Browne (2015), building upon Frantz Fanon, has discussed how surveillance can catalyze forms of “digital epidermalization” that force racialized identities upon black and brown bodies such that people come to see themselves through the eyes of others, as threatening, and comport themselves in response to such racializing gazes. (Importantly, Browne also notes vital practices of resistance, which can range from survival tactics of evasion and appropriation to more artistic interventions.) Even when people are unaware of the extent of their surveillance exposure, such as with the use of social media, they can still be performing as surveillance subjects, creating valuable data for others with every click (Andrejevic 2013). As people engage with what Bill Staples (2014) has called the “meticulous rituals of power” that characterize everyday life, surveillance is normalized through near-ubiquitous exposure and quotidian interactions—that is, not merely through general social practices, but through the particular unequal roles assigned to—and played by—individuals. Rachel Hall (2015) understands everyday surveillance rituals as elements within a broader, coercive cultural performance of risk management in which suspects must perform innocence via demonstrations of (the absence of) the threat of death. Cultural performances of risk management constitute a discriminatory biopolitical racial norm and hold up a limited and limiting concept of security as a collective cultural value (Puar 2007).
Explicit treatments of performance in surveillance studies are more rare. John McGrath’s work, *Loving Big Brother* (2004), is doubtlessly the most sustained exploration of the affordances of surveillance for desire and pleasure, especially manifest in embodied and spatial form. McGrath contends that the field’s preoccupation with crime prevention and privacy rights has deterred scholars from genuinely investigating the various “cultural products that reveal our lives under surveillance to us” (McGrath 2004: 2; see also McGrath and Sweeny 2010). In a different vein, David Phillips’ inspirational work has concentrated on the ways that surveillance infrastructures mediate the performance of identity (Phillips 2005, 2009), which is a theme discussed by Hille Koskela (2004) as well in her meditations on exhibitionist acts with new media. Phillips (2015) has further deployed theatrical performance as a research method, as a means of generating knowledge through movement, not only through discourse. Probably more so than any other scholar in the field, Phillips has also been self-reflexively concerned with the perhaps insurmountable obstacles of translating the embodied knowledge generated through artistic performances into the discursively focused and relatively conservative genre conventions of academic journals—even transdisciplinary ones like *Surveillance & Society* (Phillips 2015).

As part of the field’s ongoing shift to engage more directly with the interests and perspectives of the humanities—and toward conceiving of “surveillance as cultural practice” (Monahan 2011)—the performance dimensions of literature, art, and film have been opened up by a number of important new works. This can be seen, for instance, with critical interpretations of surveillance in literature (Rosen and Santesso 2013; Nellis 2009), art and visual culture (Barnard-Wills and Barnard-Wills 2012; Brighenti 2010; Levin, Frohne, and Weibel 2002; Morrison 2015), and cinema and television media (Dubrofsky and Ryalls 2014; Lefait 2013; Zimmer 2015). As Sébastien Lefait (2013) has argued in his book *Surveillance on Screen*, rather than simply reflecting society, surveillance media alter the way people think about themselves in relation to others, technology, and the future. Surveillance media act further, Lefait explains, to spark reflexivity about the character of cinematic or other media as well; in other words, they become media about media, gravid with the potential to transform—through and by challenging performances—the form, content, and effects of media.

Clearly, cracks are appearing in the dominant modes of inquiry in the field of surveillance studies. This special issue would like to ask: What happens if we intentionally pry open these fissures and attempt a fuller and richer engagement with performance, with the politics of performance more broadly, not just in artistic media? This would necessitate, at the very least, moving beyond perceptions of performance as exceptional, or as a certain class of perhaps more intentional “social practices.” It would require moving beyond views of performance (in cultural products and interventions) as valuable only for their pedagogical value—or as being analytically useful only as reflections of the concerns of our time. Much like surveillance, performance is ubiquitous and productive of power relations. Studying the intersection and combination of surveillance and performance, therefore, offers rich possibilities for generating new knowledge and advancing the field.

In the pages that follow, rather than provide simple summaries of the articles in this special issue, we instead initiate a more robust conversation with the themes raised by the authors. We introduce the concept of *monitored performances* and begin the process of developing a deeper theory of surveillance and performance. We invite others to join us in this endeavor.

**Monitored Performances**

We define *monitored performances* as embodied human processes that are tracked or verified by surveillance technologies and/or trained human monitors. In monitored performances, the fact of having been monitored alters the performance—its meaning, power, form, or value—and/or places the performer at risk of regulation from within or without. Richard Schechner’s definition of performance as “restored” or “twice-behaved behavior” informs our concept of monitored performance (1985: 36). Following
Schechner, we advocate an expansive notion of performance to reflect the fact that “performances are patterned processes and behaviors that ‘take place’ all along the continuum from brain events to public events of great spatial and temporal magnitude” (2004: 306). The key question for Schechner is whether a performance generates its own frame or is framed from without. The answer to that question will determine where a particular performance lies on a continuum that runs from near total information sharing to concealment (2004: 301). The question of framing, then, locates us at one productive intersection between performance and surveillance. The essays collected in this special issue suggest that the notion that there is only one frame on a given performance and that it is coming either from “within” or “without” may be holding us back in our analyses of performance and surveillance at the present conjuncture.

We adopt a poststructuralist theoretical framework for conceptualizing how power and subjectivity function in monitored performances. The concept of monitored performances is capable of attending to events that can be isolated for the purposes of analysis but understands those events as iterations within a broader, historical pattern of intentional and unintentional practices of citation that in some way reference prevailing cultural conventions and norms. The promise of the concept of monitored performances is that it offers a way to account both for the isolated event and its status within continuous processes of monitoring and performing for monitors. Diana Taylor’s (2003) concept of scenario is helpful in this regard because it allows us to account not only for how performance frames may be imposed from within or without in a given monitored performance but also for the scenario’s imposition of an additional and highly conventionalized frame on the action. Taylor’s concept of the scenario and later scenario thinking (2009) provides a way of connecting the archive of data collected to the repertoire of embodied performances. Contrary to how she has often been read, her point is not to reify a binary distinction between the archive and the repertoire (or mediated and live performances) but rather to demonstrate their entanglements. Taylor was keen to enable a historiographic practice capable of doing justice to indigenous populations excluded from the archives because of their status as oral cultures. Others have taken her up to pursue historiographies of other populations subject to what Charles Morris III (2007) has termed mnemonicide in reference to the active writing of queers out of history. Given the expansion of data collection, capture, and mining in the years since Taylor published The Archive and the Repertoire, we suggest that another possible uptake of her work is as a means of theorizing the problem of inclusion in the surveillance archive and, more precisely, as offering a vocabulary for describing and analyzing the entangled nature of monitored performances, by which we mean to assert the overlapping frames or interpenetration of what we might have once referred to as the “live” and the “mediated” in everyday embodied performances, acts of monitoring, and experiences of being monitored.

A key question for this issue is whether and how the theoretical and analytical resources of performance studies might enable new ways of conceiving the relationship between surveillance and regulation. To put it another way, we wanted to revisit and build on the project begun by Jon McKenzie in his book Perform or Else, where he attempts to shift us out of a naïve opposition between a Foucauldian framework of disciplinary power, on one hand, and a naïve reading of Richard Schechner and Victor Turner’s work as a celebration of the resistant possibilities of cultural performance via the concept of liminality, on the other. Our concept of monitored performances pushes beyond Michel Foucault’s concept of panopticism insofar as it is capable of accounting not only for practices of watching others or internalizing the gaze of others in the moment, as it were; it also accounts for the continuous amassing of archival data which extends through time and whose tracked extension through time anticipates future acts of data retrieval and analysis which may be either self-directed or imposed from without. The technical capacity to exhaustively monitor, store, and network data implies an additional set of frames that may be put around performances before, during, or after the fact of their having been monitored. The database itself, which we often understand via the metaphor of the network, can also be understood via the theatrical metaphor of the proscenium arch, as an overall frame on live action, shaping the salience and value of embodied performances in relation to their status of having been monitored or capacity to be monitored. The mere
possibility of monitoring or actual established historical patterns of particular types of monitoring may be enough to bring regulatory pressure to bear. This raises additional questions. Is the regulation of conduct necessarily bad? Are critical surveillance studies folks broadly against it? We think not. In this issue, the authors parse the nuances of various forms of regulation enabled and invited by monitored performances. They endeavor to discover and make accessible possible avenues of resistance but not in a manner that naively celebrates the failure to appear as the answer to what plagues us.

Initially, “monitored” suggests a frame of reference imposed from without. The word establishes a space of surveillance that implies a perspectival logic of watching someone or some event from a distance and rendering judgment on the performance in question. Thus, in Simon Hogue’s article in this issue, “Performing, Translating, Fashioning: Spectatorship in the Surveillant World,” he explores the political efficacy of surveillance art. His question of whether surveillance art enables or prevents spectators’ self- and world-fashioning resonates with the longstanding interest of scholars at the intersection of performance studies and anthropology with the questions of whether a performance frame is coming from within or imposed from without, whether the spectator of a performance is a participant or an observer, whether the spectator is a cultural insider or an outsider. If surveillance and monitoring are defined as practices that impose frames from without, then the question of how surveillance art positions spectators becomes, at least in part, a question of whether surveillance art successfully shifts the frame. Hogue asserts that politically efficacious art enables the redefinition of individual and collective selves. It generates opportunities for spectatorship that are distinct from corporate and state surveillance. And it actively engages spectators with performers in the work of self- and world-fashioning. Hogue defines performance as “the playful engagement with seeing, being seen, and choosing (at least partially) what is seen and how one is seen.” Drawing on Michael Warner, Hogue argues that performance can “transform appearances into meaningful appropriations of a space of visibility that allows self-fashioning.” Hogue insists that political art introduces uncertainty and that spectators are a vital source of uncertainty. So are performance spectators monitors? What is the difference? The term monitor implies a normative frame of reference guiding the judgments rendered by the monitor/s. Perhaps one enabling difference between a spectator and a monitor, then, is that the former is less certain and perhaps more open because of not adhering to a strict or standardized set of guidelines for assessing the performance. This resonates with Hogue’s reliance upon Jacques Rancière’s concept of the emancipated spectator to argue for a new approach to spectators of surveillance art, not as passive by comparison to performers/artists but equal to performers in their wakefulness and capacity for interpretation and judgment.

Performance constitutes a political act, for Hogue, when it brings forth the performers and spectators as political subjects engaged in acts of self- and world-fashioning. According to Hogue, performance “plays with the social power of seeing.” If visuality naturalizes categories and power hierarchies, as Nicholas Mirzoeff (2011) argues, then counter-visualty claims the right to look back. Hogue charges performers with the task of embodying counter-visualty (claiming the right to look back) and characterizes spectators as capable of amplifying the counter-visualty generated by performers. As Torin Monahan (2015) has argued, countervisuality must not be content merely to look back but must generate ways of looking back that challenge the naturalization of power relations and discriminatory filters of visuality. Hogue writes: “Appearance is not merely an act of submission [to surveillance], but a challenge to security consensus” and a means of refashioning the world. This last point raises the question of the relationship between performers and spectators engaged in non-theatrical monitored performances.

The keywords of Hogue’s study, “self-fashioning” and “self-determination,” beg the question of how we factor shared cultural norms and values into the process of self-fashioning or determination, given that these processes do not happen in isolation. Self-fashioning can be enacted in ways that align with dominant corporate and state ideologies and prerogatives. Within monitored spaces of performance, users are routinely invited to engage in self-fashioning in an uncritical, unthinking manner. This is frequently
the case in the self-fashioning that happens via social networking sites or gaming, for example. The same could be said for the therapeutic and makeover cultures of reality television. So for art to be politically efficacious it must not only enable self- and world-fashioning but also do so in a manner that creates alternatives to corporate and state logics of individualism and self-actualization. To return Michael Warner to his queer roots, self- and world-fashioning must queer the political concept of self-determination if they are to be politically efficacious.

This tension of whether a performance generates its own frame or is framed from without is at the heart of theories of performativity engaged in this issue. In her essay, “A Vernacular of Surveillance: Taylor Swift and Miley Cyrus Perform White Authenticity,” Rachel Dubrofsky demonstrates how whiteness becomes part of the vernacular of our surveillance society. Her analysis of two popular mainstream music videos, Miley Cyrus’ “Can’t Stop” and Taylor Swift’s “Shake It Off,” reveals how white pop stars’ ironic performances of cultural otherness effectively position cultural normativity as “authentic” or not-performing. In her critical analysis, popular media reconcile authenticity and performance via a post-racial concept of self-reflexivity in which white performers ironically put on racial otherness in order to reaffirm a stable (not-performing) core beneath the playful display. Minstrelsy is rendered comic even as it is deployed in the service of the serious project of sanctifying whiteness as authentic and true.

Cyrus’ and Swift’s ironic identity play effectively flips Judith Butler’s theory of performativity on its head in a manner that reifies, rather than challenges, the real (authentic) vs. the performed (ironic) binary. Butler’s theory of gender performativity (1990) posits that there is no stable subject with a gender identity to express, but rather only bodies that become gendered through the stylized repetition of acts that are already encoded as relatively masculine or feminine in a given historical moment. Gender performativity retroactively confers the stable subject as an effect of this ongoing process of citationality. For Butler, gender only exists in the doing. It is not a social role that can be assumed and abandoned as, for example, in Erving Goffman’s (1969) theory of the presentation of self in everyday life. For Butler, gender is never merely a voluntaristic or intentional performance but rather a compulsory citation of cultural and social norms that one inherits and is repeatedly called upon by others to embody on demand. The stakes are high because the shared cultural norms (frames) are always in danger of being revealed as arbitrary. Refusing the call of interpellation (framing from without) has proven deadly in some cases. Post-racial reflexive identity play blithely ignores the differential access various bodies have to authenticity and irony.

Dubrofsky defines all behavior as a performance, “including what is constructed as authentic.” White performers have unparalleled access to authenticity. What is presented as normative has its own performativity or what McKenzie (2001) refers to as “performative normativity.” Our author understands the interanimation of authenticity, performance, and self-reflexivity in these music videos as a form of what Simone Browne (2015) has termed racializing surveillance. The identity play on offer is not about the sedimentation of cultural norms (as, it could be argued, is the case in Beyoncé’s Formation video), but about the conservative project of shoring up whiteness as natural and authentic. Performing otherness is, then, a means of reifying the notion of a core, not-performing self, which in a post-racial context, “just so happens to be white.” Dubrofsky’s close analysis of the videos reveals the differential access variously marked or unmarked bodies have to the performance conventions of cultural stereotypes. This differential access to the stereotype implies a biological essentialism regarding race. For example, Taylor Swift’s body type “fits” the ballet costume, whereas Hip Hop dance attire is “ill-fitting” on her. In the first case, Swift must perform an ironic distance from the feminine stereotype by making goofy faces. In the second case, the costuming performs ironically upon her body, rendering the clothing she wears “ridiculous” in a racist visual joke that efficiently communicates the sobriety and genuineness of the white artist underneath.

In “Beyond data as representation: The Performativity of Big Data in Surveillance,” Matzner takes issue with the extent to which surveillance studies of big data fall back on a representational framework of
communication, which posits a distinction between reality and representation in linguistics (or the real and the theatrical in theater studies, or subjects and “data doubles” or “dividuals” in surveillance studies). Matzner argues that this approach is off the mark because “the data subject in question is not a product of splitting a person into data doubles” and then turning the data doubles against the subject but of “ad hoc, heterogeneous acts [of data citation] with strong subjectivizing force,” which Matzner describes in terms of the citationality of suspect- ing. Data-based surveillance engages in the practice of “suspect- ing,” or producing momentary suspects via practices of citation that never refer merely to an individual but always already cite data and patterns derived from the data points of many other people and objects. Matzner turns to Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity in order to provide a new theory of how big data surveillance works.

According to Matzner, data-based surveillance produces the suspect as an effect of the citationality of data. Suspect- ing is not then about diagnosis. Rather, power is generated and enacted via “the possibility of citing a wide range of data in contexts of effective authority and governance.” As John McGrath (2004: 12-14) had done before him, Matzner is picking up here on the influence of Jacques Derrida’s concept of citationality on Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity. In his argument with J.L. Austin, Derrida delights in sullying the analytical categories that Austin labored so diligently to render pure. Austin delineates constative from performative speech acts in the following manner: constative utterances describe something about the world, whereas performative utterances do something in the world. Constative speech acts can be judged true or false, but performative utterances are only ever felicitous or infelicitous (i.e., successful or failed attempts to use language to make something happen in the world). Roughly speaking, then, constative utterances are representational and performative utterances are instrumental. In “Signature, Event Context,” Derrida admires Austin’s bold leap into the performative and relays his disappointment that Austin ultimately capitulates to a narrowly representational understanding of language. Derrida says he is tempted to read Austin’s concept of the performative utterance as having “exploded the concept of communication as a purely semiotic, linguistic or symbolic concept,” but he cannot in good conscience do so (1982: 322). He references a passage in Austin where the author turns to the theater as a means of shoring up his distinction between constative and performative utterances: “A performative utterance will be, for example, in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or if spoken in a soliloquy” (1982: 324). Austin is referring to the ironic use of language, which he describes as a use that is not “serious” but “parasitic” on ordinary language. He wants to exclude such ironic uses of language from his analysis on the grounds that they fall under the “etiolations” of language. Derrida counters that the parasitic quality of theatrical speech is not an exception to how ordinary language works but the very condition of its functioning. There could never be a successful performative utterance, he argues, without the general condition of citationality of all language (1982: 325).

Matzner argues that just as one person’s speech act is always already a citation of the speech acts of many others, data-based judgments that produce suspects are always already a citation of the performances of innocence of so many others. Data-mining and analysis does not so much produce objective information about how the world can be said to be functioning as authorize those who assemble and analyze data to produce a new suspect or, as Matzner is keen to remind us, a new potential lover, friend, employee, mentor, or dog walker, for that matter. “We cite all kinds of data in becoming who we are.” Matzner’s work productively challenges the division between data-mining conducted by authorized agents of surveillance and the increasingly common practice of searching for and processing data on others as part of the routine conduct of everyday life. Just as Matzner is right to blur this distinction, Mark Andrejevic’s (2007a) concept of savvy skepticism demonstrates that suspect- ing informs other, more banal practices of data-mining and analysis. Data-based surveillance is parasitic, Matzner argues, on the data products of our everyday lives. Rightly, he shifts us away from the indexical language of data traces inadvertently left like clues at the scene of a crime—a metaphor that treats dataveillance as though it worked like photography, a medium whose status as legal evidence was grounded in its indexical relationship to the referent. This
metaphor no longer works because indexicality reinstates the division between a subject and its data doubles that Matzner effectively deconstructs. His analysis raises the same vexing questions raised by Butler’s theory of gender performativity: How are we to understand human agency vis-à-vis power in this model? And what are the possibilities for resistance?

One possibility is that offered by Chris Ingraham and Allison Rowland, who analyze the microactivist politics of the *tableau vivant*. In “Performing Imperceptibility: Google Street View and the *Tableau Vivant,*” Ingraham and Rowland turn their attention to the under-discussed phenomenon of Google Street View (GSV). By using 360-degree cameras attached to backpacks, vehicles, camels, and snowmobiles, GSV has brought an unprecedented portion of the globe under its visual gaze. This innovation, Ingraham and Rowland observe, embodies a unique politics of surveillance that distinguishes it from most other forms of monitoring carried out in what Andrejevic (2007b) calls the “digital enclosure.” If that enclosure infiltrates our spaces of work, leisure, consumption, and domesticity by mobilizing our active consent to constant surveillance, then GSV operates according to a different logic of consent. While countless people voluntarily litter the streets with the data trails of their networked lives, Ingraham and Rowland point out that with GSV even those who live “off the grid” can still be digitally enclosed. “As the car rolls by,” they write, “the panoramic GSV eyes cannot *not* photograph.”

Andrejevic offers one potential solution to these encroachments of the digital enclosure: “We have to consider the actual costs of the convenience on offer and start thinking—and communicating—outside the digital enclosure” (2007b: 315). But for our authors, this “perpetual state of exposure” opens up creative possibilities for play and resistance. Presenting an alternative to Andrejevic’s politics of withdrawal, Ingraham and Rowland turn to vernacular performances that reaffirm a collective sense of joy and rebellion in the face of ubiquitous surveillance. The authors analyze a 2008 street performance carried out in Pittsburgh, called “A Street with a View,” in which local artists organized a celebration—complete with a parade, marathon runners, confetti, and a marching band—that was designed to be captured when GSV’s roving sensors rolled by. This performance, whose basic condition of existence was pervasive corporate surveillance, prevented GSV’s cameras from capturing a sullen, unpeopled scene of their disadvantaged neighborhood. Instead, it allowed local residents to disrupt GSV’s disinterested representational ethos and recast their neighborhood in a way that transformed a mundane moment of surveillance into an opportunity for community affirmation and public celebration.

This, according to Ingraham and Rowland, is the key to the *tableau vivant*: “the value of the microactivist tableau lies not in its effects of outward resistance, but in its production of positive affects for the performers and their audience.” Heeding Monahan’s (2015) warning about the aestheticization of anti-surveillance activism, the authors turn to the Deleuzean feminist philosophy of Rosi Braidotti to argue that monitored performances provide an ideal opportunity for the collective production of positive affects. This emphasis on affect provokes an innovative take on the *zoe/bios* divide, the dissociation which, since at least the time of Aristotle, has divided the world’s animal species into two categories: the human, with its logos-derived political life of *bios*, and the rest of the planet’s animal life, with the pre-linguistic desires and irrepressible instincts of *zoe*. While Heidegger (1999: 17) and Derrida (2009: 461) did much to preempt this anthropocentric/logocentric dissociation, Braidotti makes the fascinating move of flipping this ancient dichotomy on its head: *zoe*, which thrives especially on affect production, becomes the privileged element of political life, while *bios* is unmasked for all its repression and its tendency toward rational control (cf. Agamben 1998).

For Ingraham and Rowland, the political potential of *zoe* can be expressed in the activist power of monitored performances that center on the raw experiences of life and death. To illustrate, they discuss how a pair of actors staged a live birth on a Berlin sidewalk that was captured by GSV. While this spectacle had a different political orientation than “A Street with a View,” it brings up similar questions about how activists and community members can resist surveillance-enforced representation by
“performing imperceptibility”—that is, by galvanizing a sense of representational surplus that asserts one’s irreducibility to the contextual confines of a photo, a video, or a series of zeroes and ones. Ingraham and Rowland urge us to discuss: “What if the purchase of these performances didn’t derive from their capacity to initiate change, but from how they affect sustainable ways of carrying on?” Indeed: perhaps one political promise of monitored performances is their capacity to provide us with opportunities to locally circulate joy and other world-soothing affects.

In “Reimagining Resistance: Performing Transparency and Anonymity in Surveillance Art,” Gary Kafer provides us with a very different portrait of surveillance resistance. Kafer focuses on the multimedia art of Hasan Elahi, a Bangladeshi American who was detained on suspicion of terrorism in the months following the September 11th attacks. Once Elahi was cleared, after a protracted series of federal interrogations, he decided to level an original web-based critique of the American surveillance apparatus. By providing a slew of personal photographs and time-stamped geolocative information, in its earliest days Elahi’s Tracking Transience website offered a provocative statement on resisting surveillance in the pre-social media era: rather than retreat into privacy, Elahi blasted the web with data about his habits, whereabouts, and other elements of his personal life. According to our author, Tracking Transience illustrates how performances of profligate transparency can undermine the surveillance projects of capital and the state.

Kafer turns to art theorist Inke Arns, who describes two ways in which transparency can challenge the prevailing politics of surveillance: the transparency of surveillance and transparency through surveillance. While the first calls for publicizing our society’s underlying (and often hidden) mechanisms of surveillance, the second—and more interesting—calls for openly performing personal transparency in the midst of ubiquitous surveillance, “thus stripping that information of its value within the market.” According to Kafer, in digital capitalism information is so valuable precisely because it is withheld, captured, and fought over by private interests; flooding the market with one’s personal information thus undermines the proprietary potential of those data.

Kafer’s vision of private resistance hinges on the fact that personal information derives its financial and political value from its capacity to be turned into easily processed digital data. The monitored work of digital art thus melts into a swarm of zeroes and ones, forming a database that, according to Kafer, “operates on the basis of form instead of content. It is not so much imperative to depict what Elahi is doing at a given moment, but rather that some type of media is uploaded in the first place.” Kafer engages the form/content divide in both a political and a scholarly register: politically, Kafer challenges the received wisdom of liberal privacy advocates by illustrating that the activity being surveilled is less important than the technologies, protocols, and institutional formations that provide the technical conditions for ubiquitous data collection. Scholarly, Kafer aligns himself with what might be called the “surveillance turn” in media studies: invigorated by the work of German media theorist Friedrich Kittler, scholars in this vein have declared the triviality of content vis-à-vis the centrality of technological form and function (see Winthrop-Young 2011). Jeremy Packer recently expressed this sentiment when he called on critical scholars to turn our attention to the epistemological—rather than the ideological and representational—capacities of media: “Understanding media not merely as transmitters—the old ‘mass media’ function—but rather as data collectors, storage houses, and processing centers, reorients critical attention toward the epistemological power” of media (2013: 297). The “epistemological power” of media is essentially their surveillance power—their ability to make certain knowledges possible or impossible based upon their biased capacities to collect, store, and process information (Kittler 1997). Thus by urging us to recognize the epistemological function of photographic art-as-data—rather than the ideological or aesthetic elements of its content—Kafer’s article provides a highly unique illustration of how artistic performances can serve as a compelling site of convergence for media and surveillance studies.

Further developing these observations, Kafer notes that art has been subjected to the depoliticizing logics of digitization. This new politics of art, therefore, presents unique challenges and opportunities that
traditional aesthetic and representational critiques cannot address. Elahi’s *Tracking Transience* project aesthetically registers this critical awareness by, in the words of our author, “subordinat[ing] the importance of the photograph in order to prioritize the construction of his massive database. . . . The corresponding data double is . . . a hollow outline of his virtually identity, waiting to be filled with information that Elahi continually makes opaque under the guise of transparency.” By offering a “hollow” performance of total transparency, Elahi obfuscates those elements of his identity and activity that today’s sensors are best equipped to capture and transform into capital.

In addition to asking how monitored performances give rise to opportunities for creative resistance, the articles in this issue also explore how monitored performances—under the guise of *performance monitoring*—provide new opportunities for the fine-tuned regulation of self and others. Take, for example, the performance reviews characteristic of American corporate culture and high-tech industries in the late 20\(^\text{th}\) and early 21\(^\text{st}\) centuries. In these professional arenas, Jon McKenzie notes, workers and technologies “perform . . . or else”—that is, they get fired, defunded, canceled, or discontinued. McKenzie (2001) “rehearses” a general theory of performance that moves us from Foucault’s disciplinary society to that of the performance. Workers and technologies perform profitability and innovation in order to ward off the looming threat of obsolescence. McKenzie’s theory of performance, therefore, articulates the perpetual conditional status of having to prove economic (not to mention political and social) viability.

Given the shifts described by McKenzie, performance monitoring may be one of the most normalized articulations of monitored performances. As we know it today, performance monitoring grew out of the classical economists’ attempts to theorize how labor forces could be managed under capitalist relations of production. During the Industrial Revolution, theorists like Andrew Ure and Charles Babbage further defined performance monitoring by describing new management techniques, divisions of labor, and surveillance routines that would find their ultimate “scientific” expression in the turn-of-the-century work of Frederick Winslow Taylor (see Braverman 1998: 59–60). Entranced by the Gilded Age’s technical achievements and its dreams of political and economic progress, Taylor sought to secure a “greater national efficiency” by boosting the performance of the American labor force. Asserting that “maximum prosperity can exist only as the result of maximum productivity” (1913: 12), Taylor devised a systematic management apparatus that maximized productivity by monitoring, measuring, and comparing the performance of workers. This epistemological task, for Taylor, called for “gathering together all of the traditional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the workmen and then . . . classifying, tabulating, and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws, and formulae” (1913: 36). Taylor’s brand of performance monitoring set in motion a media-centric process of knowledge production that remains dominant to this day; Taylor’s stopwatches (1913: 67), notebooks, ledgers, and bookkeeping libraries (1913: 37–8) set the stage for the digital technologies that would revolutionize performance monitoring in the later 20\(^\text{th}\) century.

According to Taylor, the keys to this regime of scientific observation were precision-driven media technologies and carefully trained, neutral supervisors. According to Taylor’s description of this process: “[The workers] were given all kinds of tasks, which were carried out each day under the close observation of the young college man who was conducting the experiments, and who at the same time noted with a stop-watch the proper time for all of the motions that were made by the men” (1913: 55). It is no surprise, of course, that cutting-edge media technologies (like stopwatches) are invoked as the solution to problems of imprecision and inefficiency. Technology’s central role in forging the mythos of American labor innovations, especially at the turn of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century, is well known (see Carey and Quirk 2009). But the other interesting part of Taylor’s remembrance is “the young college man”—the upper-class gentleman who, because of his class and cultivation, possessed the judgment and intelligence necessary to calculate the talents, infractions, and maximum potential of the workers sweating before him. Taylor’s regime of performance monitoring, therefore, was founded upon scientific logics of objective, privileged observation that (1) subject worker performance to the competitive demands of technological efficiency and precision,
(2) empower select individuals to determine the parameters of satisfactory performance, and (3) rationalize hierarchical control by an observing bureaucratic elite (see Gilliom and Monahan 2010: 96).

When performance monitoring stepped out of the factory and into diverse lines of work, education, and leisure, it retained these basic biases and tendencies. While most professions have been influenced by the accountability regimes that characterize contemporary performance monitoring, the transformations have been especially dramatic in fields like education (Lipman 2010: 159–74; Gilliom 2010: 194–209), healthcare (Monahan and Fisher 2011; Morgan 2014) and policing (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 295–320; Manning 2011: 63–84). As Elia Zureik points out, digital technologies facilitated the development of new monitoring procedures that “allowed employers and management to control more efficiently the bodies of workers, pace of work, and productivity levels than was the case with direct visual monitoring or the sequencing of automated machinery of the Fordist assembly-line type” (2003: 32). Graduating from stopwatches, ledgers, file cabinets, and management libraries, digital tools and biometric surveillance technologies gradually made their way into the performance monitoring repertoire. Urinalysis, keylogging, telematics, CCTV, and mobility sensors allow management to constantly monitor employees and compare their performance to benchmarks and institutional ideals (see Ball 2010). Accordingly, workers increasingly find themselves regulated by and according to the protological control of algorithms.

For example, in Donald N. Anderson’s essay “Wheels in the Head: Ridesharing as Monitored Performance,” passengers’ ratings of driver performance are taken as an objective measure of worker performances and experienced by drivers as a not-quite-real-time index of whether they will keep their jobs for another day or two. Anderson renders Goffmanesque frame analysis vital to understanding everyday life in social contexts that are always already saturated by web-based media. In a historical moment in which we need to theorize everyday life in hybrid spaces “enchanted by the social interface,” as Anderson puts it, performance studies scholarship is crucial because it provides frame analysis. Anderson develops frame analysis for the contemporary moment such that it is capable of accounting for multiple, competing frames and their negotiation across the hybrid spaces in which everyday life gets performed and monitored. As an analytical lens, performance allows us to move across contexts of web-based performances and live, embodied performances of self in our everyday lives in a manner that productively troubles notions of monitoring as coming either from within or without. As Anderson’s research on ride-sharing drivers’ experiences demonstrates, algorithms are not self-sustaining or autonomous agents of power. Algorithmic culture needs human actors to invest in the allegorical social scripts framing contemporary power relationships, which for ride-sharing drivers is largely a corporate framing of their social encounters with passengers as a “kinder, gentler, and friendlier” version of the comparatively “curt, crass, and cold” economic exchanges between taxicab drivers and their passengers. As his analysis bears out, the ride-sharing driver’s performance of friendliness takes form as an enactment of difference from the cultural stereotype of the “foreign” cabby who does not speak English. Anderson’s work demonstrates the extent to which workers must negotiate live performances in social-media-rich environments. In his analysis this amounts to the additional labor of performing “frame-work” or negotiating multiple frames at once. In the case of ridesharing, drivers negotiate their techno-performance rating and their embodied affective performance of the friendly (not-a-cab-driver) ride-sharing driver.

As the growing popularity of ridesharing illustrates, technologies that monitor the mobility and biological activity of the human body have had tremendous commercial success (Andrejevic and Burdon 2015). In recent years the dynamic human body has become the target of an unprecedented array of self-monitoring technologies and procedures (Monahan and Wall 2007), as exemplified in cultural trends like the “Quantified Self” movement (e.g., Swan 2013; Whitson 2013). Wearable technologies have “empowered” the consumer to monitor the body’s athletic performance, regulation of insulin, speed and number of footsteps, metabolization of sugar, circulation of oxygenated blood, menstrual hormone production, and countless other elements of bodily performance. These personal data can then be compared to the
information captured from other measured bodies, as well as to expert-constructed norms of wellness, public health, fitness, and body size.

Apps and technologies like FitBit, PeriodTracker, sleep cycle alarm clocks, mySugr’s Diabetes Logbook, and fetus tracking apps like My Baby’s Beat exemplify this turn toward personalized body performance monitoring, and new apps are being constantly developed to satisfy our cultural desires to measure and optimize the human body. As Rachel Sanders has observed, these “digital self-tracking devices,” or DSTDs, “facilitate unprecedented levels of biometric surveillance, extend the regulatory mechanisms of both public health and fashion/beauty authorities, and enable increasingly rigorous body projects devoted to the attainment of [normativity]” (2016: 1). As we have seen with the rapid rise of DSTDs and related “biometric body projects,” this personal performance monitoring is being coupled with consumption-oriented drives to quantify, maximize, and compete.

Cloud computing, as well, has proven to be a valuable tool in the monitored performance ensemble, as companies like Google, Amazon, and Microsoft are quickly developing computers that synthesize data from numerous sensor points to analyze the performance of a given body. Microsoft’s cloud computing service, Azure, is developing a suite of “cognitive” services that integrate assorted sensors scattered throughout the homes of consumers: for example, sensors placed on bathroom scales can inform physicians of a patient’s weight, while artificially intelligent machines analyze the patient’s phone conversations to analyze the patient’s psychological state. Added to data gathered from pacemakers, blood pressure monitors, refrigerator drawers, mirrors, and any additional sensors that the patient encounters, this information will be used to establish a patient’s deviance from collective norms and then to suggest pharmaceuticals, health devices, foods, exercise equipment, and other products to help patients augment their biological potential (Simonite 2016).

The concept of monitored performance, therefore, is helpful in thinking through how people negotiate the co-presence of external and internal monitors (and hence multiple competing frames) of their performance of self in everyday life. More specifically, studies of monitored performances can provide more nuanced understandings of people’s experiences and negotiations of the burdens of self-regulation vis-à-vis cultural norms and expectations regarding public embodiment. In “Performing Diabetes: Felt Surveillance and Discrete Self-Management,” Lucherini writes about the visibility of self-managed medical care among people with diabetes. Working from Foucault’s concept of panoptic surveillance, the author develops the concept of “felt surveillance” in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of how persons with diabetes negotiate and manage the cultural norms and expectations surrounding the disease. Approaching disease and its regulation as a performance rather than a medical condition allows Lucherini to move beyond the treatment of disease as a biological or medical fact to the more interesting terrain of diabetes as a dynamic process of self-care. In this study, diabetes emerges as an embodied experience of visibility (“felt surveillance”) constrained by the current conventions for performing diabetes, which entails an ongoing negotiation of the relative publicity or privacy of the condition.

Across the interview data gathered by Lucherini, diabetes is a “hidden” medical condition, which becomes publicly visible in the moment of its management. This raises interesting questions regarding how public or private performances of self-managed medical care ought to be. These questions are further complicated in the case of diabetes because they occur within cultural contexts and everyday routines already laden with symbolism regarding community and sharing (in the case of taking meals together) and secrecy and shame (in the case of discretely managing the body’s biological functions and potential for dysregulation in public restrooms). Performing diabetes requires the negotiation of whether one will buck the norms and conventions of suspending the grotesque body in favor of the social, hygienic body and inject insulin in plain view at the table, or whether one will leave the table to go inject insulin in a public restroom. The latter choice is symbolically laden, given that public restrooms are “spoiled” spaces. Performing self-care within these settings risks defiling the person and the medical condition by (repeated)
association. In such scenarios, people with diabetes choose to take on the negative connotations and unpleasant sensory experience of the public restroom in order to protect persons without diabetes from the sight of injection or blood testing. Or they choose this because they prefer a brief unpleasant sensory experience to the felt stigma attached to the procedures for managing diabetes in public.

The stigma attached to managing diabetes in public is moral. Critics accuse diabetics who openly inject insulin and test their blood of “flaunting” their disease. Discretion is moralized for the benefit of those without diabetes in a manner that is strikingly similar to the popular homophobic refrain: “I don’t care who you have sex with, just don’t flaunt your sexuality in public.” Indeed, a return to analyses of historical case studies by scholars working at the intersection of queer and performance studies might suggest models of resistance useful in contemporary contexts of the regulation of hidden disabilities or medical conditions within public spaces. Consider Andrew Parker and Eve Sedgwick’s (1995) analysis of the military’s historic “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy via a return to J.L. Austin’s passage on the parasitic quality of ironic or theatrical speech. They zero in on his exclusion of this set of speech acts on the grounds that they belong not to “ordinary” language but “etiolated” language. They bother to look up the word to find out what it means. As it turns out, it refers, among other things, to a plant grown in the absence of sunlight, to a life form diseased, blanched, or otherwise lacking in vigor. For Parker and Sedgwick, etiolate resonates all too powerfully with what a policy like Don’t Ask Don’t Tell did to queers in the military. In an effort to make room for resistance to such policies, they focus on an overlooked aspect of Austin’s speech act theory: uptake, or whether or not a particular utterance takes hold in a given context. Uptake shifts the focus of the analysis from the speaker and receiver/s of the utterance to its silent witnesses. Sedgwick and Parker read Don’t Ask Don’t Tell as akin to the performative utterance of a dare to act straight. The policy installed a regulatory sexual regime in which queers were under pressure to stay in the closet or risk losing their jobs. For a dare to work it must have uptake, meaning the implication of a gendered or homophonic threat (e.g., you are a wussy if you don’t perform heterosexuality) needs the silent reinforcement of the presumed collective sexism and homophobia of the witnesses present at its utterance. In the case of the dare, for example, witnesses to the issuance of a dare might intervene on behalf of the person dared by saying: “Don’t conform for my benefit.”

Queering the cultural norms and expectations surrounding bodily appearances in public spaces might prove a promising avenue of resistance for persons with diabetes and others who face the stigma of self-managed medical conditions. It would entail demonstrably deconstructing the binary healthy/sick that undergirds the comforting analytic, and by extension ontological purity, of the categories healthy/sick. The notion that “sick” people belong in hospitals and private spaces proliferates because “healthy” people feel that they deserve to be protected from the appearance of disease, which threatens to challenge their claim on total wellness. Likewise, spectators of public performances of self-managed care might perform resistance to cultural norms and expectations that would exclude such performances from public view by refusing uptake of the performative utterance: “If you are sick, go to the hospital,” which is most often communicated nonverbally via expressions of aversion and disgust.

**Conclusion**

The concept of monitored performances could serve as a useful guide for navigating between surveillance studies and performance studies, as well as for detecting and highlighting the many complementarities between these fields. More than that, in deploying monitored performances here we have tried to illustrate the concept’s potential for galvanizing spontaneous—and, we hope, insightful—new approaches to theorizing the imbrications of surveillance and performance.

As the articles in this issue illustrate, the term monitored performances limns a broad range of conceptual and political areas: the tensions between the temporal status of monitoring and the isolable spontaneity of the monitored event; the fragmentary negotiation of multiple performed frames; self-determination and the
regulated performance of the self; and, of course, the status and possibility of resistance given this general social framework of monitored performances. The insights gathered in this issue lead us to suggest that surveillance studies might profitably benefit by moving beyond “within” or “without” constructions of power relations to explore the manifold frictions among the multiple frames of monitored performances. There are also the important questions of how technologies perform, and how they mutate their conditions and functions through the process (Harding 2015). So, a critical part of such analyses would be to take seriously the performance capacities of surveillance systems to conjure subjectivities and epistemologies that exceed design intentions or technical protocols. And as these technologies help monitored performance migrate into the depths of the human body, we would argue that critical scholars should trouble the promotion of consumptive—and oftentimes disturbingly eugenic—solutions to variations in human performance (see Breckenridge 2014).

One of the more provocative questions raised by this issue, we believe, is: What precisely is it that “we” aim to resist within critical surveillance studies? The various schools of transparency within surveillance studies—more, less, more-is-less—take for granted a liberal vision of the right to privacy (see Hall 2015: 14). In so doing, they miss the degree to which performances of voluntary transparency (or making a show of having nothing to hide) have become a symbol of distinction within overdeveloped societies as against individuals and populations that are excluded from the biopolitical project of high-tech risk management. Instead of referring to governments or corporations that know more about their citizens or customers than the other way around, what if asymmetrical transparency referenced the discriminatory ascription of transparency and opacity to populations based on a biopolitical racial norm that is not narrowly phenotypical but references instead the current symbolic markers of one’s capacity to affirm life and futurity versus those qualities that mark one out as excluded from that collective and coercive project? By parting with these concerns, we hope to leave others with a conceptual framework that can provide fresh insights into the relationships among surveillance, self-regulation, biopolitical control, and creative—maybe even joyful—performances of resistance.

References


