Monahan, Torin, and David Murakami Wood. 2018. Crime and Policing. In Surveillance Studies: A Reader, edited by T. Monahan and D. Murakami Wood. New York: Oxford University Press, 173-177.

SECTION 7

CRIME AND POLICING

Crime prevention and control are the overt rationales for much state and private surveillance, particularly that occurring in public, open spaces. For a long time in surveillance studies, consideration of video surveillance (or closed-circuit television, CCTV) was a dominant area of study. In many ways, this explains the prominence of British academics and studies of the United Kingdom in surveillance studies in the 1990s and early 2000s, as the United Kingdom was a pioneer of state public open-space video surveillance.

The United Kingdom remains a good—or perhaps, bad (Murakami Wood and Webster 2009)—example because it is so well studied, and there are some very good summary articles on the spread of CCTV in that country (Fussey 2004; Webster 2004). Although there were earlier experiments by police conducting undercover surveillance with movie cameras (Williams 2003; Williams et al. 2009), the main story begins in the late 1980s with a combination of factors that are shared by other nations. In general, transformations of capitalism and the restructuring of urban space generated support for surveillance, which became a mechanism for securing places of commerce and policing borders between neighborhoods (e.g., of newly formed gated communities).

During this time, urban centers were successively hollowed out and then revitalized through a combination of securitization, gentrification, and privatization. This process was well described by Mike Davis (1990) in relation to the US situation, and specifically Los Angeles, but Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong (1999) identified similar trends in the United Kingdom in their book, *The Maximum Surveillance Society*. Further, the creation of "enterprise zones" and out-of-town shopping centers and malls in the 1980s, under the pioneering neoliberal government of Margaret Thatcher, led to the decline of urban retail centers. Newly popular private commercial spaces were highly securitized with security guards and video surveillance cameras. Local authorities in the UK looked to them as an example, adopting many of the same tactics for their city centers, encouraged both by the police, who argued that video surveillance, in particular, would prevent crime, and by business initiatives like town-centre management (TCM) and business improvement districts or associations (BIDs/BIAs), where the private sector could pay for some of the costs of these systems (Coleman 2004).

These early examples of actuarialism and risk-reduction as crime-control policy were taken up at the national level by the post-Thatcher administrations of both John Major

and Tony Blair, who despite being from different political parties, shared a common approach to "caring" authoritarianism (Fussey 2004; Webster 2004), reflected in a whole suite of neoliberal, surveillance-based policies (SSN 2006). As a result of substantial national funding, CCTV in the United Kingdom went through massive periods of expansion from the mid-1990s and again in the early years of the 2000s.

However, the economic drivers would never, on their own, have generated the public support for, or at least apathy towards, video surveillance. In the United Kingdom, there were a series of trigger events or moral panics, involving football hooliganism, child abduction, and terrorism, such as the attacks by the Provisional IRA on the Conservative Party conference in 1986, and then in other British cities, and particularly London in the early 1990s (Coaffee et al. 2009). One iconic event was the abduction and brutal killing of two-year-old Jamie Bulger by two ten-year-old kids in 1993. A grainy CCTV image of Bulger being led by his assailants out of a Merseyside shopping center became a focal point for the public's outrage, driving further support for video surveillance, despite its presence and lack of efficacy in preventing Bulger's death or even in assisting with the identification of the killers (Monahan 2006).

In this section, excerpts from Norris and Armstrong and Mike McCahill provide just a glimpse of the authors' detailed empirical accounts of British cities and British police, security guards, retail-store employees, and ordinary people, as they negotiate surveillance in the context of economic, political, and spatial transformations. The excerpts show adaptation to these new forces, and in many ways surveillance's effectiveness as a means of social control at some levels. That said, they also find a fair amount of cynicism, failure, and the manipulation and misuse of new technological powers for purposes of discrimination, personal amusement, and low-level corruption.

Despite the complexity of actual video surveillance deployment (Goold 2004; Smith 2015), evidence of its limited ability to prevent crime (e.g., Gill and Spriggs 2005; Welsh and Farrington 2009), and its inefficient use of public funds (Groombridge 2008), the proliferation of video surveillance provided the United Kingdom, and especially London, with the dubious distinction of being labelled the surveillance capital of the world.[1] The role of London as a global leader showed when, after 9/11, the example of London was promoted in the United States and elsewhere as having a model urban security policy (Murakami Wood and Webster 2009). The "ring of steel" established around the City of London and Docklands (Coaffee 2004) was appropriated for use in traffic control (the Congestion Charge Zone) in the early 2000s and then reintegrated into a security perimeter (Coaffee et al. 2009), which was further extended for the 2012 Olympic Games (Fussey et al. 2011). The role of sporting and other mega-events is considered in Philip Boyle and Kevin Haggerty's excerpt, which is a piece that examines the circuits of influence around policing techniques and technologies. This is followed by an excerpt from Pete Fussey and colleagues that looks explicitly at how security efforts for the 2012 London Olympics were coupled with urban rejuvenation projects that attempted to purify what were remarkably diverse neighborhoods. Minas Samatas (2004) was one of the first scholars to interrogate the political scandals and consequences of Olympic security with the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Athens, but mega-events remain a rich and important area of study (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). Colin Bennett and Kevin Haggerty's edited collection, *Security Games* (2011), is an excellent place to start for further exploration of this area.

The result of these trends is that in major cities around the world, public open space video surveillance seems both normal and expected (Doyle et al. 2012). Even at its extreme—for instance, with the security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, with its networks of steel fences and gates, both "fan" and "protest zones," anti-aircraft missiles, heavy human security, biometric identification, and so on—the pattern is little different from that for the London Olympics and involved many of the same transnational corporations and experts. Similarly, China's "Safe City" project, announced in 2013, funded a massive expansion of biometric-enabled, "smart" video surveillance in cities, with around 10 million new cameras installed and integrated with transport, schools, and shopping malls. The emphasis of this project is on regions of ethnic tension and potential "terrorist" threat, which is a rationale that has been widely criticized, especially in the context of the Olympics, as effectively supporting censorship and the suppression of political dissent (Klein 2008). Nonetheless, as advanced as these systems might be, they are simply augmented versions of the systems being implemented in the United Kingdom, United States, and elsewhere.

Part of the reason for the spread of cameras has to do with the association of visibility with knowledge and accountability. Surveillance cameras are a visible manifestation of the state's concern with crime and security—they are a kind of "security theater" (Schneier 2008) that assuages fears about unknown risks (De Cauter 2004). The spread of video and other forms of surveillance also builds upon a broader culture of visibility and voyeurism, seen, for instance, with the current popularity of small amateur drones or with contemporary social media practices of "stalking" others through their profiles (see Section 12). There is furthermore a highly emotional and affective dimension to video surveillance. The excerpt by Hille Koskela explores this dimension while also problematizing the relationship of video surveillance to crimes against women. Whereas video surveillance is often not present in spaces where women are most at risk of violence (such as the home), in places where it is present (such as shopping malls), it is unlikely to prevent harassment or assault and may even make those spaces more hostile to women if CCTV control room operators act as voyeurs.

In another register, widely accessible camera technologies, especially in mobile phones, have supported attempts by activists and others to hold the state and police officers accountable through techniques of counter-surveillance or "sousveillance" (see Section 13). The excerpt by Andrew Goldsmith situates this trend within a larger regime called the "new visibility" (Thompson 2005), where people harness new technologies to become active producers, not just consumers, of visual content and evidence. There have been several responses to these developments. One has been to equip the police with body-worn cameras both so that the police perspective can be seen, but also so that the means of visual representation can be controlled (Brucato 2015; Schneider 2016). This should be seen alongside other attempts by states to limit the use of public photography or recording in the name of counterterrorism and security (Newell 2014). Once again, the United Kingdom has led the way here with the inclusion of anti-photography provisions in law, for example in Section 44 of The Terrorism Act; illegally intimidating photographers and seizing their equipment; and even making expressions of interest in video cameras itself a reasonable ground (probable cause) for police intervention.

There have likewise been other responses to the "failure" of public open space video surveillance to prevent crime. One response has

been to reinvent them as vital components in a larger system of databases and algorithmic processing with the aim of achieving forms of anticipatory, preemptive policing (van Brakel and de Hert 2011). A related approach has been to integrate the cameras into multifunction, interactive security systems that augment surveillance capabilities with microphones, loudspeakers, and potentially even digital "noises," often undetectably coupled with existing urban infrastructure like streetlights. This is increasingly part of the informatization of cities through "smart city" initiatives, presented, like earlier waves of gentrification and privatization, as an unquestionable civic good. With government funding, police have also invested heavily in many cities around the world in biometrics; flying drone cameras, including micro air vehicles (MAVs); and other robotics; and there has been a general extension of military and quasi-military technology into urban space as part of global surveillance surges. Under what Stephen Graham (2010) has called the "new military urbanism," everything from terrorism through crime to mere disorder and antisocial behavior are increasingly seen as part of a spectrum of threat justifying extreme intervention.

Such policing and securitization logics infuse public institutions, while—paradoxically—also being framed as necessary reactions to the failures of such institutions. For example, the final excerpt by Torin Monahan and Rodolfo Torres shows how the contemporary American school system has become a site of paranoid monitoring of children at least as much because of the threat *from* kids (see also Taylor 2013). Surveillance in this context restructures public education around unforgiving zero-tolerance policies, relentless accountability measures, and overlapping education and criminal justice systems (for instance, with armed and uniformed police officers on school grounds). All of this disproportionately punishes poor, minority students, with disastrous consequences for their lives and life chances (Hirschfield 2010; Kupchik and Monahan 2006). From this perspective, surveillance must be understood in relation to the "prison-industrial complex"—itself a long-standing testing ground for experiments in surveillance. Schools act almost as an antechamber to a life of harsh policing, imprisonment, and the constant threat of death for some, as much as a vector of opportunity for others.

NOTE

1. Ironically, it was the media's serial misreporting of some notional figures from Clive Norris that helped promote this idea. The two figures, which are still being used, are the presence of "4.2 million CCTV cameras in Britain," and the average person "is caught on camera 300 times daily." The first figure derives from Mike McCahill and Clive Norris's (2002) admittedly rough "guesstimate," extrapolated out from a casual count of cameras in one small ordinary neighborhood in London around 2000. The second figure comes from a little fictional vignette of a day in the life of "Thomas Kearns" in *The Maximum Surveillance Society* (Norris and Armstrong 1999), which was intended to illustrate how many cameras a person could possibly be caught by in any one day. It remains the case that no one knows exactly how many cameras there are in Britain or indeed in most countries in the world. Additionally, although media and scholarly accounts still refer to Britain as the video surveillance capital, China has likely far surpassed Britain in both numbers of cameras and their capability (Gilliom and Monahan 2013).

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